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Abstract
Background: Ethical issues related to comparative effectiveness research, or research that compares existing standards
of care, have recently received considerable attention. In this paper we focus on how Ethics Review Committees
(ERCs) should evaluate the risks of comparative effectiveness research.
Main text: We discuss what has been a prominent focus in the debate about comparative effectiveness research,
namely that it is justified when “nothing is known” about the comparative effectiveness of the available alternatives.
We argue that this focus may be misleading. Rather, we should focus on the fact that some experts believe that
the evidence points in favor of one intervention, whereas other experts believe that the evidence favors the
alternative(s). We will then introduce a case that illustrates this point, and based on that, discuss how ERCs should
deal with such cases of expert disagreement.
Conclusion: We argue that ERCs have a duty to assess the range of expert opinions and based on that assessment
arrive at a risk judgment about the study under consideration. We also argue that assessment of expert
disagreement is important for the assignment of risk level to a clinical trial: what is the basis for expert opinions,
how strong is the evidence appealed to by various experts, and how can clinical trial monitoring affect the possible
increased risk of clinical trial participation.
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Background
Ethical issues related to comparative effectiveness research,
that is, research that compares existing standards of care,
have recently received considerable attention. Such research
is warranted when the evidence is insufficient to decide be-
tween alternate interventions that different clinicians may
reasonably offer their patients. Comparative effectiveness
research is done with the hope that additional research will
shed light on whether one option is superior or causes
fewer adverse effects.
In this paper we focus on how Ethics Review Committees
(ERCs) should evaluate the risks of comparative effective-
ness research. In cases of insufficient evidence to make a
definite judgment, reasonable physicians and patients may
prefer a particular intervention, at the same time as they
recognize that other patients and physicians prefer alterna-
tive interventions. The reason for the disagreement is not,
in these cases, because the two alternative interventions are
known to have different risk or benefit profiles, but, in the
absence of a universally agreed upon standard for evaluat-
ing evidence, experts disagree about what the probabilities
of the risks and benefits of the alternative interventions are.
The challenge for ERCs in these cases is how they should
assess conflicting judgments by relevant experts. We shall
introduce a case that illustrates this challenge.
First, however, we discuss what has been a promin-
ent focus in the recent debate about comparative ef-
fectiveness research, namely that it is justified when
“nothing is known” about the comparative effective-
ness of the available alternatives. We argue that this
focus, exemplified by the controversy over the SUP-
PORT trial, may be misleading. Rather, we should pay
more attention to the fact that some experts believe
that the evidence points in favor of one intervention,
whereas other experts believe that the evidence favors
the alternative(s). We will then introduce a case that
illustrates this point, and based on that, discuss how
ERCs should deal with such cases of expert
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disagreement. Our case involves two options to pre-
vent cardiovascular events, both of which have a risk
of serious bleeding, but the experts disagree about
the probabilities of bleeding. We argue that ERCs
have an obligation to ensure that they have assessed
the range of expert opinions when they identify
research risks and make decisions about the appropri-
ateness of research. We will begin by briefly reviewing
the controversy over the SUPPORT trial.
The SUPPORT trial
The US regulatory agency, the DHHS Office for
Human Research Protection, raised concerns about a
case of comparative effectiveness research in a very
public way when they sent a letter in 2013 to the
University of Alabama regarding the SUPPORT
(Surfactant, Positive Pressure, and Pulse Oximetry
Randomized Trial) study, published in the New
England Journal of Medicine in 2010 [1]. In this trial,
1316 premature infants were randomized into two
groups, with different oxygen saturation targets, in
one between 85% - 89%, and the other 91% – 95%.
Both target ranges were reported to be within the
clinically used and accepted limit. Evidence suggested
that O2 saturation levels higher than the target range
may improve overall survival of infants but may
increase the chance of oxygen-induced retinopathies
in infants resulting in blindness. The target range
studied in the trial reflected a tradeoff between maxi-
mizing survival and minimizing adverse events, such
as retinopathies, at the lower end. At the start of the
trial, it was argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence of any survival benefit among infants who
would get the higher end of O2 saturation, in fact all
evidence showed that there was no difference in sur-
vival within the range provided in the trial [2]. It was
also not clear there would be any benefits in terms of
reduction in retinopathy at the lower end of the ac-
ceptable target range. The investigators argued that
since all the infants in the trial received the standard
of care- i.e. clinically acceptable and standardly uti-
lized O2 saturation levels-, there was no additional
risk to these infants by participating in this research
project.
The OHRP disagreed with this assessment. They
asserted that this study was more than a minimal risk
study, and that the disclosure of the risks of the study
in the informed consent form was inadequate. In fact,
in their letter OHRP describes this study as one that
involves substantial risks to the infants [3]. This
determination caused an extensive debate in the
bioethics literature, with prominent bioethicists both
supporting [4] and disagreeing [5] with OHRP’s
assessment of the risks.
The lack of attention to expert disagreement
There is a straightforward argument for why research is
minimal risk when it compares two interventions that are
used and recommended by competent physicians in their
ordinary clinical care of patients. The argument applies
whenever there is no evidence that would lead reasonable
clinicians to recommend or reasonable patients to prefer
one or the other intervention. Although some existing
evidence might favor one intervention, and other evidence
favor the alternatives, there is no evidence that picks out
one intervention as clearly superior. Nevertheless, for a
variety of reasons, some physicians and patients prefer
one of them, resulting in variations in what is actually
provided in ordinary, clinical care. These ‘reasons’ could
be experience, ‘gut feelings’ or ‘institutional policies’ based
on a particular adverse event in that institution, or some-
thing else. Despite such personal reasons for preferring
one intervention, these are not necessarily reasons for
others to prefer that same intervention. If all reasonable
people agree that there is no knowledge that would
lead one to definitively recommend one or the other
intervention, then allocation to one or the other
treatment arms in a trial is no more and no less rea-
sonable than the allocation in actual practice, which
is based on factors that are just as random as the for-
mal randomization procedure in the trial. Hence,
there is no added risk of trial participation. Of course
it may turn out that one option is shown to be better than
another in the trial, but at the time of trial initiation there
is no basis for saying that trial participation adds any risk
compared with choosing one of the options outside the
trial context. [2, 6].
This argument is clearly stated by Lantos et al. in a dis-
cussion of a trial comparing two doses of aspirin to pre-
vent cardiovascular events [6]. They argue that such a
study is minimal risk
because the patients would be facing those risks
anyway, and it is unknown [our emphasis] whether
participation will increase, decrease, or have no effect
on the risk levels. Thus there is no reason to believe
that being in the study is any riskier than those
patients’ daily lives. While random treatment
assignment will shift the treatments given to some
patients within the range of currently accepted
standards of care, given the uncertainty about which
treatment is superior (which is the essential
presupposition of clinical trials), no patient or
physician [our emphasis] would be sure whether this
random shift in treatment would lead to benefit or
harm for either group of patients and thus for any
individual patient within those groups. We believe
that the SUPPORT study occurred in precisely this set
of circumstances.
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In this quotation the connection is made between “not
knowing” and judgments by all physicians and patients
that they are uncertain about which intervention is su-
perior. The statement “it is unknown”, is therefore
understood as “all experts agree that it is unknown” or
“all experts agree that there is no evidence for the super-
iority of one intervention over another”.
Critics of the SUPPORT study made a number of argu-
ments, all of which essentially question whether nothing is
known about the consequences of different oxygen levels,
or that there is agreement about this among experts. They
pointed out that in research one cannot individualize treat-
ment, or that treatment assignment in research is according
to protocol which is different from ordinary clinical care,
where one may change treatment according to a patient’s
individual characteristics [7]. But this only changes the as-
sessment of the risk of the research if some experts believe
that changing oxygen levels individually makes a difference.
If nobody knows whether assignment to a particular point
within a range is more or less risky, and this is true for both
the initial setting and for any changes that might occur over
the course of the trial, the method of assignment cannot
affect the prospective risk assessment, and there is no
reason to believe that assignment based on certain individ-
ual patient characteristics is more or less risky than
assignment according to a fixed protocol. But if claims
about the benefits of individualization are contentious
among experts, then a case can be made that trial participa-
tion may have a different risk profile.
Similarly, Silverman and Dreyfuss made a general argu-
ment that since clinical trial participants in the SUPPORT
trial received care within restricted ranges of that provided
in the ordinary clinical care context, they did not receive
the same standard of care as those who did not participate
in the trial [8]. They quote with approval from the OHRP
determination letter. Altering the range of oxygen levels
an infant was supposed to receive was a crucial part of the
study design. By creating two groups receiving two
discrete ranges of oxygen levels, the study increased the
likelihood that there would be significant differences in
outcomes observed between the two groups.
This argument is only valid if there is reason to believe
that restricting the range to two discrete ranges will
affect the risk to the subjects. But if all experts agree that
based on available evidence, there is no reason to believe
that any particular sub-range is better than another, then
there is no basis for such a claim.
The argument put forward by Lantos et al. therefore
depends crucially on what is the best characterization of
the state of knowledge before a trial is initiated. If every-
one agrees, meaning that there is consensus among
experts that there is no evidence for the superiority of
one intervention over another, then randomization to
eligible interventions does not increase risk. But if there
is expert disagreement about the overall benefits and
risks of eligible interventions, then randomization may
not be risk neutral. Kim and Miller have indeed empha-
sized the varieties of standard-of care-research [9]. In
certain cases, some experts argue that evidence points in
one direction, others argue that evidence points in an-
other direction. Some experts will conclude that, given
the evidence, one intervention is to be preferred over
the others, others will recommend alternatives. While
the premise accepted by Lantos et al. may be true for
some trials, and it may be true for the SUPPORT trial in
particular, it does not follow that it is true for a large
number of comparative effectiveness trials. In particular,
there is a range of cases about which the experts dis-
agree about what the evidence says about the benefits
and risks of the various interventions in use. Lantos
himself may have recognized this point when he said in
reply to criticism of his position:
These post-SUPPORT controversies suggest the
complexities that we face going forward. If experts
cannot agree about how to quantify the risks and
benefits of a study even after the results are avail-
able, it is hard to imagine how we will ever agree
on an appropriate way to describe the risks and
benefits of studies before the results are known.
Solving this problem will be more important than
coming to consensus about the specific issues of
SUPPORT [10].
We therefore need to pay more attention to expert
disagreement when assessing clinical research. Cases
of expert disagreement present tough challenges for
an ERC when they need to assess risk-benefit profiles
of research. We shall now present a case that illus-
trates this point.
Main text
The case of antiplatelet therapy to prevent cardiovascular
risk
Antiplatelet therapy has long been recognized as an
important part of a treatment and prevention program
in patients with coronary artery disease. In 2000, for
example, the American College of Cardiology/American
Heart Association made the following recommendation:
“Antiplatelet therapy should be initiated promptly.
Aspirin (ASA) is the first choice and is administered
as soon as possible after presentation and continued
indefinitely”.
The major concern with administering aspirin is the risk
of gastrointestinal bleeding. This is particularly the case
for patients who have had a history of such bleeding.
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Therefore, the ACC/AHA guidelines recommended in
2000 that
“A thienopyridine (clopidogrel or ticlopidine) should
be administered to patients who are unable to take
ASA because of hypersensitivity or major
gastrointestinal intolerance”[11].
The guideline classified the strength of evidence for
both of these recommendations. The first is a class 1 A
recommendation, and the second is a class 1 B recom-
mendation. Class 1 means ‘general agreement that a given
procedure is useful and effective”. The addition of A
means that there are “data from multiple randomized
clinical trials that involved large numbers of patients”, and
B means that “data were derived from a limited number of
randomized trials that involved small number of patients
or from careful analyses of nonrandomized studies or
observational registries”. In 2002 the guideline was updated
and changed slightly. Only clopidogrel was recommended
for patients who cannot take ASA, and the strength of evi-
dence for this recommendation was upgraded to 1A [12].
Some experts disagreed with the evidence that sup-
ported this opinion. This was especially true for experts in
the prevention of gastrointestinal bleeding, while the rec-
ommendations in favor of clopidrogel originated within
the community of cardiovascular clinicians. In 2005 Chan
et al. published a study where they compared clopidogrel
alone to aspirin together with a proton pump inhibitor
[13]. Patients who were on a preventive aspirin regimen
and who experienced a bleeding ulcer were randomized to
one of the two intervention arms, after their ulcer was
healed. They showed that aspirin together with a proton
pump inhibitor (PPI) was far superior to clopidogrel alone
in the prevention of recurrent upper gastrointestinal
bleeding. Another trial published in 2006 confirmed this
finding. In 2007 the revised ACC/AHA guidelines recom-
mended, based on the 2005 study by Chan et al., that a
proton pump inhibitor be added to clopridogel in patients
with a history of gastrointestinal bleeding with aspirin
[14], even though Chan et al.’s study had only demon-
strated the superiority of ASA plus PPI over clopidogrel
alone. Finally, in 2008 a consensus document was pub-
lished on reducing the gastrointestinal risks of antiplatelet
use. The document stated that “Substitution of clopidogrel
for ASA is not a recommended strategy to reduce the risk
of recurrent ulcer bleeding in high risk patients and is in-
ferior to the combination of ASA plus PPI.” [15].
The case illustrates both the dilemma and the import-
ance of doing clinical research on existing interventions.
On the one hand, in 2002 there were clear and unam-
biguous recommendations by reputable professional so-
cieties, recommending clopidogrel alone in patients at
risk for gastrointestinal bleeding. Based on that
recommendation, the proposed trial proposed by Chan
et al. would expose half of the trial population to un-
acceptable risks. Experts who supported the 2000/2002
ACC/AHA guidelines did actually criticize the trial by
Chan et at, noting that they were “disturbed by the scien-
tific rationale and questionable design of the current trial”
[16]. On the other hand, there were reasonable doubts
about the soundness of the existing recommendations. An
appropriate clinical trial would settle the issue, but ERCs
and experts may be reluctant to approve it given the strong
recommendations in favor of one intervention.
This is clearly not a case where experts agreed that
there was insufficient evidence to distinguish between
the two interventions in the trial. Some experts believed
that the evidence identified one intervention as clearly
superior, even classifying the strength of evidence as 1A.
However, other experts believed that the evidence
supported a different approach. How should we evaluate
the risk of trial participation in cases such as this one?
Emily Evans and Alex London have previously argued
for the importance of making a distinction between what
they call cases of agnosticism and cases of expert disagree-
ment when deciding about enrolling human subjects for
research [17]. They define agnosticism as a state where
“members of the expert medical community have not yet
made determinate judgments about the relative thera-
peutic merits of a set of interventions”. They apply this to
the policy level about what intervention to recommend
for groups of patients, and argue that it is consistent with
individual physicians making more specific recommenda-
tions for individual patients. Examples would be if one can-
not make a general policy recommendation for a particular
intervention for all patients, but some physicians recom-
mend one specific intervention for older patients. We have
identified a similar state where there is consensus among
experts that there is no evidence that would favor one
intervention over the other, but this would apply both at a
policy level and for individual recommendations: the focus
is on the agreement that not enough is known, but it can
apply both to groups and to individuals. Evans and
London, and we, contrast this with a state where there is
disagreement among relevant experts about the relative
therapeutic merits of a set of interventions. Again, we focus
on the policy or general level about what to do for classes
of patients, whereas for Evans and London the focus is on
disagreements about individual patients. They argue that
in cases of such disagreement there is clinical equipoise
and entering a particular patient to a trial is admissible:
If at least a reasonable minority of experts would
recommend A over B as treatment for C, while others
recommend B over A, then we hold the option of
random assignment [of a particular patient] to a trial
of either A or B admissible.
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This assessment about an individual subject takes place
after an ERC has approved the trial, and decided that the
risks to the subjects are reasonable in relation to anticipated
benefits. Before starting to enroll individual subjects, there-
fore, clinical researchers and ERCs must decide whether a
particular trial is justified at all in terms of the potential
risks to subjects. While the decision rule proposed by Evans
and London may apply when experts disagree about what
to do for individual patients, it is difficult to see how one
could apply it when deciding what the risk of trial participa-
tion is for all eligible subjects in a proposed clinical trial,
hence, difficult to see how it helps ERCs to decide whether
a trial should be approved. This is the decision faced by
ERCs, research sponsors and researchers themselves. We
shall now address the complexities of such risk assessments
when experts disagree.
ERCs and risk assessments
A common challenge of comparative effectiveness
research is therefore how an ERC should evaluate the
risks of a trial when experts disagree in the sense of en-
dorsing different approaches. An ERC needs to provide
an overall risk assessment when experts disagree, taking
the interests of all prospective research subjects into ac-
count. In some cases, such as when dealing with partici-
pants who cannot give consent themselves, ERCs are
also required to provide an explicit risk assessment of
the research, to ensure that it does not exceed the risk
threshold above which the research cannot be approved.
It seems that an ERC has essentially three options, all
of which are unsatisfactory. They can accept the risk
judgments of one group of experts over the other, they
can make their own assessment of the risk level of the
individual interventions, or they can conclude that it is
impossible to arrive at any definite judgment about risk.
The two first options presuppose that members of ERCs
have sufficient expertise to make their own risk judg-
ments, which they typically do not have. The third op-
tion would mean an end to a lot of comparative
effectiveness research. There is, however, a fourth option
which does not involve making judgments about what
the risks of the individual options are or about how
reliable the evidence for each of the options actually is.
We shall now present this fourth option.
How ERCs can make risk judgments when experts disagree
When deciding what the risk level of a trial is, the ERC
need not, and should not, accept the risk judgment of
one particular group of experts, nor should they make
an independent assessment of the evidence, and make
their own risk judgment. Instead, they should assess the
range of expert opinion and base their judgment on that
assessment. If experts agree, an ERC should use that
agreement as a basis for their judgment. In the special
case when experts agree that it is unknown whether one
intervention is riskier than others, i.e. all experts agree
with that assessment, then that is what the ERC should
base their risk assessment on. However, if there is
disagreement about the evidence among reasonable
experts, the ERC should make a decision on that basis.
It is important to note that in the following we assume
that disagreements among recognized experts are genu-
ine. By genuine disagreements we mean that there is
some evidence, recognized by all, in favor of one inter-
vention, and some evidence in favor of other interven-
tions. The disagreement is about the weighting of the
evidence, and what the evidence in favor of the interven-
tions is, all things considered. Trials should aim to re-
spond to these disagreements by gathering additional
evidence about the interventions in comparison to each
other. By recognized experts we mean professional soci-
eties, or groups of researchers at leading institutions.
This is meant to exclude, in this context, individual re-
searchers who hold idiosyncratic opinions, or appeal to
evidence that is not generally accepted. In particular, an
ERC should not assume, without further argument, that
the researchers submitting a protocol for review, al-
though they may be experts, fulfill our criterion of rec-
ognized experts.
One might worry that expert disagreements can lead
to decision paralysis for ERCs: how can an ERC arrive at
a decision when no matter what they decide, there will
always be reputable experts who disagree with them? In
the clopidogrel case, for example, those who adhered to
the practice guidelines would have criticized the ERC if
they approved the trial, because they believed that it ex-
poses subjects to unacceptable risks. If they do not ap-
prove the trial, the ERC would have been criticized by
other, equally reputable experts, because they are not
willing to approve comparative investigation of un-
proven interventions.
In order to see that it is possible to approve trials even
when experts disagree in this way, let us begin by assum-
ing a simple case where there are two experts, and two
interventions, and first assess the risks a patient faces
making a clinical choice. For each intervention, the com-
bined frequency/probability of adverse events is given,
and they are equally severe in the two groups, but the
probabilities differ. We also assume that there is no un-
certainty in the estimate of these probabilities, according
to the individual expert assessments. The two experts
may disagree with each other about the uncertainties,
but are confident of their own risk assessment. The posi-
tive effects of the interventions are the same for both in-
terventions. Given the disagreement between the two
experts about the risks of these interventions, what
would a rational patient choose? In order to answer that
question, we need to distinguish between four different
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scenarios. Consider the scenario provided in Table 1.
According to expert 1, intervention A has a combined
risk frequency of 1%, whereas intervention B has a com-
bined risk frequency of 2%. Expert 2 has exactly the op-
posite assessment. In this first scenario, there seems to
be no basis for preferring one particular intervention. If
expert 1 is right, then intervention A is the preferred
choice, with an expected frequency of side effects of 1%.
But if expert 2 is right, the expected frequency is 2%.
Intervention B has exactly the same expected side
effects, but associated with the opposite interventions
according to the experts. In this case there is no reason
to prefer one of the interventions to the other.
In our scenarios we have used a standard decision theor-
etic framework with two alternative actions, but the uncer-
tain outcomes are states of affairs that occur if one of two
experts are correct in their assessments, and the probability
that each group of experts is correct is the same, i.e. 50% in
our example. The utilities associated with these states are
the same in all possible outcomes, but may occur with dif-
ferent known probabilities according to the experts. Since
we are considering side effects, the outcomes are better the
lower the probabilities of the side effects.
In the second scenario (Table 2), there is a reason to
choose intervention A. The best outcome would be 1% in-
dependent of which expert is correct. The worst outcome
would be 3% if expert 1 is correct but 2% if expert 2 is cor-
rect. In the third scenario (Table 3), there seems to be a rea-
son to choose intervention B. The worst outcome is 2%,
but the best outcome is 0.5% if intervention B is chosen,
compared with 1% if intervention A is chosen.
The fourth scenario (Table 4) is more difficult. Here it
would depend on how risk averse the patient is. The
expected benefit is higher for intervention B, but the
worst case scenario is worse for intervention A.
If a clinical trial is proposed to compare interventions
A and B, it would be uncontroversial in the first sce-
nario, but problematic, given the assumptions, in the
three other scenarios. The assumptions are that we have
no reason to prefer one group of experts to another, that
there is no uncertainty about the probability estimates
within the expert group, and the values of the risk are
the same in all outcomes. We will return to a discussion
of how an ERC should consider the risks of trials in
these other scenarios after we have applied our frame-
work to the clopidogrel case.
The proposed trial compares two interventions that
were both available when Chan et al. started their research
in the early 2000s. The rationale was, in the opinion of the
investigators, that there was little justification for the clin-
ical guidelines in place at the time, specifically that clopi-
dogrel had fewer gastrointestinal side-effects compared
with aspirin. Many disagreed with this assessment, as is
reflected in the guidelines. Practice guidelines are one im-
portant source for the identification of standard of care.
The 2002 guideline clearly stated that the standard of care
for patients with high risk of gastrointestinal bleeding who
need to be on an antiplatelet preventive regimen was clo-
pidogrel. However, the justification for the guideline was
less clear, especially for giving clopidogrel class 1A recom-
mendation status. This recommendation seems to be
based on one clinical trial comparing clopidogrel with as-
pirin, and the aim of this trial was not to assess the advan-
tages of using clopidogrel in patients with a history of
gastrointestinal bleeding [18], but rather as a secondary
outcome, a reduction in gastrointestinal bleeding was as-
sociated with clopidogrel use. In fact, therefore, there was
sparse direct clinical trial evidence that clopidogrel was
the preferred preventive regiment in this patient group.
There was some evidence of effectiveness from a clinical
trial, but definitely not “data from multiple clinical trials
that involve large numbers of patients”. Clopidogrel’s
pharmacological properties also suggested it would cause
less bleeding risk than aspirin, but such inferences are
known to be unreliable in the absence of hard clinical trial
evidence. In the absence of conclusive evidence that clopi-
dogrel could indeed lower overall risks of gastric bleeding,
reasonable clinicians had legitimate reasons to question
the guideline and disregard this advice, as has been
discussed elsewhere [19]. Reasonable clinicians therefore
argued that since aspirin is actually the preferred prevent-
ive strategy in the guideline, this drug should be pre-
scribed to patients with high risk of bleeding together
with a proton pump inhibitor (PPI) that is known to caus-
ally block the formation of bleeding ulcers.
There were therefore two groups of experts, one group
represented by the clinical practice guidelines who
claimed that clopidogrel had fewer gastrointestinal side-
Table 1 Two experts with opposite assessments of risks
Expert 1 Expert 2
Intervention A 1% 2%
Intervention B 2% 1%
Table 2 One outcome is best independent of expert
disagreement
Expert 1 Expert 2
Intervention A 1% 2%
Intervention B 3% 1%
Table 3 Experts agree on worse outcome, but one expert favor
one intervention
Expert 1 Expert 2
Intervention A 1% 2%
Intervention B 2% 0.5%
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effects than aspirin, and the other group who claimed
that there was reason to believe that aspirin together
with a PPI would have fewer side-effects than clopido-
grel alone. If we assume that the two regimens have the
same positive effects in preventing cardiovascular events,
this is a case similar to scenario 1 above. In spite of ex-
pert disagreements, a rational patient or provider had no
definitive reason to prefer either one of the two inter-
ventions outside of the trial. If there is no reason to pre-
fer either one of the two interventions, there is also no
reason to prefer a choice of one of the two over
randomization to one of the two interventions, given
our assumptions.
The risks of therapy and the risks of research
The clopidogrel case turns out to be relatively straight-
forward given our assumptions because the choice faced
by patients in the clinical setting was essentially no
different than choosing between entering a clinical trial
or choosing one of the interventions outside the trial
even though the overall aggregate risks might have
turned out to be very different once the trial was com-
pleted. In this sense this case is structurally similar to
cases where there is agreement among experts that
differences between two interventions are unknown.
Our focus on the importance of expert disagreement,
however, has identified important issues that need to be
addressed when ERCs evaluate research when experts
disagree about the risks.
First, we have identified three additional scenarios
above. The first scenario is a special case because the
experts agree on the magnitude of the probabilities; the
only disagreement is about which intervention has the
higher risk. In the three other scenarios, the magnitudes
are also different, and it is then not obvious that a
clinical trial can be justified, certainly not as a minimal
risk trial, unless the side effects are very minor. It is only
in the first scenario that the risk of individual choice of
therapy is the same as the risk of research.
Second, we have assumed that there is only one type
of risk, in our case gastro-intestinal bleeding, and it is
the same for both interventions. Typically, there are
several possible adverse events associated with interven-
tions, and they may occur with different probabilities.
These adverse events may also be evaluated differently
by different people. While it may be possible to combine
these into one outcome measure for individuals, it is
difficult to see how that can be done on a population
level. For many individuals, some outcomes are more
important than others, and disagreement about the
probabilities for these outcomes are more important
than disagreements about other outcomes. If experts dis-
agree about outcomes that are evaluated differently by
different patient groups, making risk assessments of tri-
als are going to be much more difficult.
Third, individual attitudes towards risk aversion may
also influence choice. This also complicates risk assess-
ments of trials, as was illustrated in scenario 4.
Fourth, we have assumed that there is no uncertainty
associated with the probability judgments within the in-
dividual expert groups.
While some of these assumptions may make it more
difficult to justify a trial, because the trial is more risky
than ordinary clinical care, even when experts disagree,
others actually make it possible for the trial to be less
risky than ordinary clinical care. The relevant risk as-
sessment for the ERC is not exactly the same as that
faced by the clinical patient. The ERC needs to compare
the risks patients face when making decisions about
therapeutic choices in situations where experts disagree
about the consequences of the options, with the risks
they face in clinical trials where experts disagree about
options that are provided by a random mechanism:
What are the overall risks of ordinary therapeutic
choices compared with the overall risks of random as-
signment to the relevant therapeutic options? There are
two ways in which the risks of the trial may be reduced
compared with ordinary clinical care.
First, one may restrict the selection of subjects to a par-
ticular group, based on their preferences, either by explicit
inclusion and exclusion criteria, or by self-selection based
on information provide to prospective participants.
Decisions about criteria used would depend crucially on a
proper analysis of expert views and where they disagree.
Basically, the aim would be to change scenarios 2–4 to
scenario 1, by excluding subjects with certain types of risk,
or certain types of evaluations of risks, or with a particular
risk aversion profile.
Second, one may introduce risk reduction strategies as
part of the clinical trial itself, such as increased monitor-
ing. The aim would again be to make the trial conform
to the first scenario, by concentrating on reducing the
risk levels for those events where there is disagreement
about the risk levels among the experts (scenarios 2 & 3
above). Receiving any treatment in a clinical trial setting
may be less risky than receiving the same treatment
outside the clinical trial setting, because of increased
monitoring, more careful follow up, or other factors. For
example, in the clopidogrel trial extra monitoring within
the trial might identify bleeding and allow for treatment
sooner than in standard clinical care.
Table 4 Choice depends on risk aversion
Expert 1 Expert 2
Intervention A 0.5% 3%
Intervention B 2% 1%
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Obligations of ERCs
Our analysis of how to assess the risks of comparative
effectiveness research in situations where experts dis-
agree has focused on how ERCs should assess the risks
of such research. One may object to our analysis by
pointing out that assessing the risks of research should
be the responsibility of the researchers themselves, and
placing this responsibility on ERCs will place additional
burdens on committees that already have difficulties ful-
filling their mandated tasks within the resources allo-
cated to them.
It is important to note that we do not recommend that
ERCs should take on the responsibility of evaluating the
scientific evidence, or do formal literature reviews. In fact,
we explicitly reject this option above. Assessing the rele-
vant science for a clinical trial is the responsibility of the
proposing researchers and sponsors of such research, and
is routinely done in protocols submitted to ERCs. ERCs,
however, do have a responsibility to ensure that this as-
sessment is unbiased in the sense that all relevant expert
opinions have been included in the assessment. ERCs can-
not simply rely on a particular group of experts for their
decision, but they need to do a systematic review of the
range of expert opinions about the interventions in the
proposed study. We do not propose that ERCs do a sys-
tematic review of the actual evidence, but rather a review
of relevant expert assessments.
In the case introduced here it would have been wrong
for the ERC to simply base their decision on the practice
guideline adopted by American College of Cardiology/
American Heart Association, which was what the ERC
did when they did not at first approve the Chan et al.
2005 study. It would have been equally wrong for the
ERC to simply base their risk assessment on the views of
experts who supported the 2005 study, ignoring the
ACC/AHA guideline, in particular because the investiga-
tors were from their own institution, and even though
they turned out to be correct in their assessment of the
risks. An ERC has an obligation to identify the range of
expert opinion, and decide based on their own assess-
ment of expert opinion, along the lines suggested above.
The ERC may very well agree that this study is minimal
risk, but not because all experts agree that one interven-
tion is no better than the other. The ERC could decide
that the study is minimal risk because based on their
assessment of expert opinions, it concluded that patients
in the trial are not exposed to a higher level of risk than
those choosing their preferred intervention outside of
the trial. In other words, overall there is no reason for
an individual patient to prefer either A or B. Hence the
study can be categorized as minimal risk even though all
the experts believe the risks of one of the study interven-
tions are greater than the risks of the other study
intervention.
It follows from this that ERCs need to do a much
more thorough review of the risks of research than is
typical today. They need to be confident that they have
assessed all relevant views and doubts about standards
of care. It is not enough to simply point out that the
interventions provided in the trial are also provided
outside the trial, or that a particular professional society
has issued a guideline or recommendation. Table 5
summarizes the types of issues an ERC needs to
assess (domains), and examples of what the ERC
needs to do (details). It is important to note that the
emphasis in this table is on the responsibility of the
ERC to identify relevant expert opinions and to assess
the relevance of any disagreements among experts,
but it continues to have to rely on experts, including
the researchers and sponsors who have submitted the
trial for review, for the scientific review of existing
evidence. However, the ERC should not simply regis-
ter expert disagreement, but need to assess the nature
and the scope of such disagreements. Not all expert
disagreements have the same implications for ERC
risk assessments.
Conclusions
The issue of how to assess the risks of comparative effect-
iveness, or standard of care, research, has been debated
lately. In this paper we have argued that it is necessary to
distinguish cases where there is consensus among experts
that there is insufficient evidence favoring one or the other
standard interventions from cases where experts disagree
about the evidence. When experts disagree, we have
argued that it necessary to assess the nature of the
disagreement so that the ERC can conclude what the risk
level of a study is. In our discussion we have argued that
ERCs have a duty to assess the range of expert opinions
Table 5 List is issues that need to be addressed by ERCs
Domain Details
Identify relevant experts - Include recognized experts
- Exclude experts with obvious bias
Identify relevant outcomes
and associated values
- Identify range of values associated




- Identify relevant disagreements about
probabilities among expert groups
- Identify uncertainty about probability
estimates within expert groups
Identify risk of research
compared with clinical care
- What is the structure of the choice




- Modify selection of subjects
- Introduce risk reduction strategies
in the trial
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and based on that assessment arrive at a risk judgment
about the study under consideration. We have also argued
that assessment of expert disagreement is important for
the assignment of risk level to a clinical trial: what is the
basis for expert opinions, how strong is the evidence
appealed to by various experts, and how can clinical trial
monitoring affect the possible increased risk of clinical
trial participation. The fact that there is disagreement
among experts about which of the alternatives is prefera-
ble is not sufficient to conclude that a clinical trial is
acceptable or poses minimal risk. The review committee
needs to further evaluate whether the disagreements
between experts essentially cancel each other out so that
there is no reason for an individual patient or provider to
prefer either A or B. This would not be the case for
example if some experts think that A is slightly less risky
than B whereas other experts believe the B is dramatically
more risky than A. ERCs therefore need to review the rea-
sons for expert disagreements carefully and systematically
before they conclude that a trial has a specific risk level or
approve a trial.
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